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BOOK REVIEWS
T=E FEDmmAL ANTITRUST Poticy. By Hans B. Thorelli.1 Balti-

more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. Pp. xvi, 658. $8.00. The
author of this book, a Swedish scholar with degrees in law, economics and political science, attempts "a synthesized social science
interpretation of the federal antitrust policy" in which "the social,
economic, political, . . . ideological and administrative aspects of

the subject" are discussed. 2 Following preliminary studies in his
native land, Thorelli, with grants from the Sweden-American
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and other sources, carried on research in the United States after 1947, mainly at Northwestern University, "the Library of Congress and the National
Archives of the United States. In addition to the present volume,
the author has published a Swedish Government monograph on
American antitrust policy, articles in Swedish journals on various
aspects of the subject, and with others (the Ad Hoc Committee
on Restrictive Business Practices) a report on the control of international cartels for the consideration of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council. He avows belief, "at once vague
and deeply rooted, in the aims and potentialities of antitrust as
an instrument of public policy"s-a conviction which is, no doubt,
both cause and outcome of his monumental investigation.
In Part I, "Genesis of Antitrust," Thorelli discusses in three
lengthy chapters the general background-legal, economic, social,
constitutional and political-of the Sherman Act, and devotes
Chapter IV to the passage of the Act and its provisions. It is the
author's view that most Americans subscribed to the philosophy
of economic egalitarianism, the mainspring of which was active
competition. In passing the Sherman Act Congress aimed to eliminate and prevent restrictions on competition, and to this end
made use of (nationalized, that is) common law doctrines against
restraints of trade and monopolies, the implications of which are
discussed in the first chapter. Thorelli thinks this approach to the
trust problem was both "elegant" and prudent: common law procedure made for concreteness and flexibility which were particularly desirable at a time when public knowledge as to the exact magnitude and character of the problem of industrial combination and monopoly was still rather limited.
1 Ph.D, LL3. A Swedish citizen who has written extensively on
Swedish and United States antitrust problems.
2 Text Introduction at 2.
3 Id, Preface at viii.
(171)
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But the author makes clear from extensive research in newspapers and periodicals that in passing the Sherman Act Congress
reflected strong antimonopoly sentiment, taking issue in this
respect with John D. Clark who maintained a quarter century
ago in his book, The FederalTrust Policy,' that the general public
in 1890 was fundamentally indifferent to the rising trust problem.
He is only slightly less critical of the traditional view-best represented by Oswald W. Knauth in The Policy of the United States
Towards Industrial Monopoly 5-- that people and press were in
frenzied uproar against monopoly by the late 1880's. Thorelli is
at one with Clark and Knauth, however, in the view that intellectuals and social theorists exerted little, if any, direct influence on
the drive for antimonopoly legislation. Two schools of thought,
the classical economists and the social Darwinists, tended equally
to ignore the monopoly problem. Committed to the dogma that
competition was automatic and perfect, the classical economists
denied or minimized the existence of monopoly, while the social
Darwinists pronounced its growth a triumph of fitness over the
inefficiency and waste of competitive struggle. In Andrew Carnegie's version, monopoly was the means to great wealth with
which to practice a gospel of wealth. The social gospel as expounded by Washington Gladden and other clergymen extolled cooperation as against competition, but was critical of monopoly.
It lacked, nevertheless, an antitrust philosophy. Social gospel advocates, for the most part, favored public ownership of natural,
and regulation of artificial, monopolies. Much the same attitude
was taken by the "New School" economists whose "impact on
public attitudes towards the trust problem at the time the Sherman Act was passed appears to have been almost imperceptible."6
Only incidentally does the author touch upon labor's attitude
toward antimonopoly legislation. He is inclined to agree with Edward Berman (Labor and the Sherman Act)7 that Congress in-

tended to exempt labor organizations from the law's provisions.
He is traditionalist also in his conclusion that John Sherman was
truly the author of the law associated with his name. Thorelli's
originality and main contribution comes in Part II, "From Form
to Substance, 1890-1903," dealing with the interactive trends in
business consolidation, public opinion, administration, judicial
interpretation and federal law-making as a process which resulted
4 CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST POLICY (1931).
5 "KNAUTH, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS INDUSTRIAL Mo-

(1914).
6 Text at 120.

NOPOLY

7

BEm AN, LABOR AND THE SHEPmAx ACT (1930).
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in the institutionalization of antitrust in American public policy.
Thorelli discusses these items topically in separate chapters, a
method which makes for considerable repetition but also for
thoroughness and emphasis. In Part Ill, a concluding chapter of
fifty pages, the author after briefly summarizing the materials of
Part I interprets and integrates in masterly fashion the mountainous mass of data piled up in Part II which constitutes the vitally
important phase of the treatise.
The author's interest in Part I centers not unnaturally on the
failure of the Sherman Act during its first decade to realize the
expectations of its originators. Inasmuch as private parties instituted fewer than thirty cases under the Act (to 1904), it was
not conspicuously self-enforcing as its authors canfidently had
assumed it would be. Public authority largely ignored the law
until 1903 when the Roosevelt Administration added invigorative
measures: adequate appropriations for an antitrust division in
the Department of Justice, an expediting act for antitrust cases in
the circuit courts, and the establishment of a bureau of corporations in the recently created Department of Conunrce and Labor. Thorelli points out that the obvious beneficiaries of the lawfarmers, wage earners and small business men-were slow to mobilize in its support: workers lost interest when trade unions
were brought under the provisions of the law, while the Populists
in their zeal for currency inflation minimized antitrust agitationa mistake in emphasis which, the author thinks, led to the downfall of the party. Be this as it may, he is on safe ground when he
insists that only after 1897 did the experts and the popular writers
agree that the philosophy behind the Sherman Act should guide
public policy on monopoly and business consolidation. The convergence of these formerly antagonistic groups was evidenced
by the two Chicago antitrust conferences of 1899 and 1900, the one
called by the Civic Federation of Chicago and the other by the
American Anti-Trust League, and by the United States Industrial
Commission whose studies (1898-1902) made at the behest of Congress and published in nineteen volumes recommended among
other things compulsory publicity of corporate activities and
more aggressive enforcement of existing legislation.
This is not to imply that Thorelli thinks enforcement of the
Sherman Act necessarily awaited pressure from public opinion.
Actually, the executive authority, before Theodore Roosevelt,
shirked its clear duty, being either opposed or indifferent to the
law. Severely critical of Harrison and Cleveland, Thorelli is
amazed at McKinley's "extraordinary torpor." Save only for Judson Harmon, Attorney General in the latter part of Cleveland's
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second administration, the occupants of that office largely ignored
the Sherman Act until Philander C. Knox, with Roosevelt's encouragement, initiated vigorous prosecution, notably in the Northern Securities and Beef Trust suits. Excepting Richard Olney's
actions against Eugene V. Debs in the Pullman Strike, not a single
anti-trust suit was initiated by Knox's predecessors, who were
notoriously negligent in aiding subordinate law officers to process
their fewer than twenty cases through the federal courts. In part
Thorelli attributes to careless preparation of its cases the failure of
the Justice Department to win crucial decisions before the Supreme Court, including the E. C. Knight8 (Sugar Trust) case of
1895, which held that the monopolistic control of the manufacture
of a given commodity per se affects commerce but incidentally and
indirectly. The unanimity by which the Court practically speaking
reversed this decision only four years later in the Addyston Pipe
and Steel9 case, along with its earlier refusal in the Trans-Missouri
Freight Association1 9 case (1897) to construe the "due process
of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on antitrust, convinces Thorelli that the judiciary was more friendly to
the Sherman Act than was the executive and was not primarily
responsible, as Professor Edward S. Corwin contends, for its tardy
and haphazard application.
Although this thesis will not be acceptable to every legal scholar, all readers will be impressed by the author's ever-conscious
attempt to formulate his conclusions in a cautious and dispassionate manner. The thoroughness of the research is suggested not
only by the length of the book but more significantly by the table
of cases, the authors' and subject index, the 22 pages of classified
bibliography and the 2004 references, the majority of whichsome at considerable length--deal critically with disputed points.
Aaron I. Abell*

* United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
9 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
10 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
* Co-author of A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmaacA (1951).
Professor of History, University of Notre Dame.
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THE PRESIDENCY TODAY. By Edward S. Corwin' and Louis W.
Koenig.2 New York: New York University Press, 1956. Pp. ix,
138. $3.00. Calm appraisal of the present position of the presidency
in our constitutional system should be welcome to many readers,
and that is what they will find in this little book by Corwin and
Koenig. Without bitterness and without hostility, the authors indicate a skeptical attitude towards claimed justification in the language of article two of the Constitution for a number of controversial
presidential actions. They relate the principal historical events
which have enabled incumbents of the presidential office to win a
real if not completely acknowledged primacy in spite of orthodox
doctrine concerning separation of powers and co-ordinate departments. At the risk of upsetting a balance of competing considera-

tions discussed in the book, a few will be selected here for brief
mention because they seem fundamental.
One factor which has advanced the position of the President is
that while urban interests are not sufficiently represented in Con-

gress, they have found receptivity to their views in the person of
the President.3 Another factor is the rise of the United States to
world leadership. In this connection the authors point out that
"... General Eisenhower is the first candidate whose claim to his

party's nomination has rested almost exclusively on his prestige
and his record in world affairs." 4 A third factor is of special interest
to lawyers. Citing Kansas v. Colorado,5 the authors state: "In supporting 'executive power' against Congress the Court may very
well be fighting its own battle for judicial power.' 6 The foregoing
are merely samples of the circumstances detailed in the book
which go far to explain the predominance of the presidency today.
The treaty power and executive agreements are, of course, not
neglected. Presidential war making, the seizure of the steel mills,
and other presidential actions which have been vehemently denounced and as vehemently defended are treated objectively but
by no means in a dull manner. A great deal of information, interestingly related, is deftly incorporated into this slim volume.
In the last chapter the authors deal with the selection and tenure
of the President. Proposed reforms of the electoral system are
critically discussed. The authors also discuss the great unsolved
problem of succession to the presidency. They point out that the reluctance of Vice-Presidents to act as President in case of presi1
2

*
4

5
6

Professor Emeritus of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
Associate Professor of Government, New York University.
Text at 64, 65.
Id. at 97.
206 U.S. 46, 81-82 (1907).
Text at 16.
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dential inability has, to some degree at least, been due to fear that
the Vice-President would thereupon become President. The
authors suggest that ".

.

. Congress would do well to declare its

sense that anyone acting as President because of a living President's inabilty does so only until the inability is removed."'7 With
respect to tenure the authors indicate that it would appear advisable to limit the President to one term. They state: "The real question would appear to be whether any President should seek a second term -whether an untried incumbent is preferable to a tired
incumbent."
Roger Paul Peters*

EssAYs ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. By Zelman Cowen' and P. B.
Carter.2 New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. xvii, 278.
$5.60. This book, written by two British barristers, is a remarkable
example of collaboration in writing under difficult circumstances,
for while Mr. Cowen was in Australia, Mr. Carter was in England
and part of the time in America.
The book is not a text on evidence law but consists of essays on
certain difficult problems which have arisen in that field. The last
three of these essays discuss problems arising under English procedural statutes and would be of little interest to American readers. The other six essays discuss problems that have been encountered under American as well as British law and they should be of
great interest to Americans. The six problems discussed are:
"Statutory Modification of the Law of Hearsay"; "Confessions and
the Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Facts"; "The Admissibility of Evidence Procured through Illegal Searches and Seizures"; "The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts"; "Some
Observations on the Opinion Rule"; "The Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil Proceedings." The authors
not only discuss the law as it is now in the light of decided cases but
they also express their opinions as to what the law ought to be.
The essay on the statutory modification of the law of hearsay sets
out the historical development of the rule against hearsay and the
various exceptions thereto and shows how certain of those exceptions have been illogically devised by the courts. The American
*

s
*
3
2

Id. at 117.
Id. at 126.
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
Professor of Public Law, University of Melbourne, Australia.
Fellow at Wadhams College, Oxford, England.
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statutes discussed are those which have been enacted in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, making admissible a hearsay statement
if the court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the
declarant. This statute apparently meets with the approval of the
writers as being the best solution of the problem. The British statute, which is a part of the Evidence Act of 1938, is criticized by the
authors as long, cumbersome and poorly drafted. The primary suggestions in this essay concern the necessity for the clarification of
the statute by additional legislation. They state that the statute as
enacted was revolutionary and apparently they doubt that it could
be scrapped altogether and a short statute enacted along the lines
of the Massachusetts act.
The essay on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent facts
discusses the American as well as the British decisions, including
the views of Dean Wigmore. The conclusion at which the authors
arrive is that, although there is logical reasoning in the contention
that a confession wrongfully induced has the ring of truth if confirmed by subsequently discovered facts, it would be unwise to
make a wrongfully induced confession admissible under any circumstance because of the temptation it would offer to the police
to obtain a confession in a wrongful manner in the hope that once
obtained, its reliability would be subsequently demonstrated.
The essay on the admissibility of evidence procured through illegal searches and seizures discusses the American as well as the
British decisions, particularly the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States. Again the authors, while conceding the logic
of the argument of Wigmore that the sole criterion of admissibility
should be the danger of admitting false evidence, take the position
that as a matter of public policy, to, prevent the police from pursuing wrongful practices, they should not be allowed to see their
wrongful practices bear fruit by having the courts admit evidence
which was wrongfully obtained.
The longest of the essays and the most detailed is that on the
admissibility of similar facts, which considers evidence tending to
show that the accused in a criminal case behaved on another occasion in a way more or less similar to the way in which the prosecution alleges that he behaved on the instant occurrence.
The essay begins with a very true statement, "Poverty of settled
principles in the midst of authority has been the most striking feature of the law relating to the admissibility in criminal cases of
similar facts."3 It then proceeds to analyze in considerable detail
the leading decisions in the British courts. The American decisions
3

Text at 106.
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are not discussed although they are as many and as diverse as
those in Great Britain.
The authors point out that in considering admissibility, a differentiation must be made between two categories of similar fact
evidence. One category comprises evidence the primary relevance
of which is via propensity, while the oher comprises evidence
which has substantial relevance in other respects.
As to the first category, which the authors state is a much wider
category than has often been supposed, they argue that propensity
evidence is dangerous because its probative value depends entirely upon the assumption that the accused has not mended his ways.
They finally arrive at four conclusions: (1) Evidence of similar
facts which is relevant ,primarily via propensity is inadmissible
unless it is exceptional. (2) Such evidence is exceptional and
therefore admissible provided (a) it has great probative value
upon any issue on which the jury is likely to use it, and (b) its
admission is not unnecessary (i. e., the issue upon which it is
tendered can reasonably be regarded as a real one in the circumstances of the case). (3) Evidence of similar facts which has
circumstantial relevance otherwise than via propensity (even if
as well as via propensity) is admissible provided it is sufficiently
relevant. (4) In criminal cases the judge has a discretion to exclude evidence admissible under any of the foregoing rules if
their strict application would operate unfairly against the accused.
In their essay on the opinion rule the authors state that its main
purpose is to review possible justification for the rule as it is applied in practice by the courts. They quote from such American
authorities as Thayer, Wigmore, Maguire, and the American Law
Institute Model Code of Evidence, as well as the English authorities. They conclude that the proper administration of the rule
should be that proposed by Judge Learned Hand, namely, that the
rule excluding opinion evidence should be limited to cases where,
in the judgment of the trial court, it will not be helpful to the jury
and that the ruling of the trial judge to that effect ought not usually
be regarded as subject to review by higher courts.
The essay on the admissibility of criminal conviction in subsequent civil proceedings discusses not only the course of English
authority but that in Canada, Australia, and South Africa. As to
the law on this subject in America, the authors show that there are
wide variations not only in the decisions in the different jurisdictions but even within a single jurisdiction. The rules which the
authors recommend for adoption as a solution to these great conflicts of authority are as follows: (1) A conviction following a
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plea of not guilty and made by a superior court should be admissible in subsequent civil proceedings as evidence of the facts upon
which the conviction was based. (2) A conviction following a plea
of guilty should not be admissible. (3) A conviction or finding
following a plea of not guilty or denial but not made by a superior
court should be admissible in subsequent civil proceedings only
if the judge is satisfied that its admission would be in the interests
of justice. (4) In all cases where the evidence is admitted, the
judge should warn the jury of the dangers of regarding the conviction or finding as conclusive evidence of the facts on which it
was based and failure to give such warning should constitute a
misdirection.
The book is extremely well written, with the impeccable choice
of language and the literary style which always can be expected
from English writers on the law. The conclusions of the authors are
well reasoned and the book should be of value to practicing lawyers, judges, and other students of the law, and to legislators in
helping them to straighten out legal thinking on the difficult problems discussed.
John E. Tracy*

* Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan Law School.

BOOKS RECEIVED
ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE FOR CERTIFIED PU3LIC
ACCOUNTANTS. By the Committee of the American Institute of

Accountants. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Bureau of
Business Research, 1956. Pp. xxiii, 151. This report, directed
to various educational institutions and to state legislative and
administrative bodies, points out goals and standards for the
improvement and regulation of the accounting profession.
ANTI-TRUST LAW
*THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY. By Hans B. Thorelli. Balti-

more: The John Hopkins Press, 1955. Pp. xvi, 658. $8.00.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Robert E. Brown.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. Pp. 219. $3.50.
Professor Brown makes a critical examination of the evidence
used by Charles Beard in his "Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution."
*THE PRESIDENCY TODAY. By Edward S. Corwin and Louis W.

Koenig. New York: New York University Press, 1956. Pp. ix,
138. $100.
VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION.

By

Thomas R. Powell. New York: Columbia University Press,
1956. Pp. xv, 229. $3.50. James S. CarpenterLectures, Columbia University. These lecture topics include judicial review,
intergovernmental immunities, expansion of national power,
and state power to tax and regulate commerce.
CORPORATIONS
GIANT CORPORATIONS: CHALLENGE TO FREEDOM.

By T. K. Quinn.

New York: Exposition Press, 1956. Pp. 198. $3.50. A challeng-

ing exposition which presents in extremely forthright terms the
invasion of big business upon the freedom

enterprise.
*Reviewed in this issue.
(180)

of American
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CIVIL RIGHTS
FREEDOM IS AS FREEDOM DOES.

By Corliss Lamont. New York:

Horizon Press, 1956. Pp. xviii, 322. $3.95. This volume presents
a history of the developments of civil liberties generally and
in the author's own life with an explanation of the pertinent

laws.

CRIMINOLOGY
GUIDE TO MODERN POLICE THINKING. By Raymond E. Clift.
Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1956. Pp. xviii, 369. $7.70. A
valuable text supplemented with chapter-by-chapter review
questions and bibliographies which provide some modern
aspects of police work.
PRISON WAS My PARIsH. By Rev. Baden P. H. Ball. London:
William Heineman, Ltd., 1956. Pp. 252. 18s. A portrait by a
British prison chaplain of various men who are regarded by
society as outcasts but as sensitive human beings by their
"padre."

A
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*ESSAYS

ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE.

By Zelman Cowen and P. B.

Carter. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. xvii,
278. $5.60.
FROM EVIDENCE TO PROOF. By Marshall Houts. Springfield,
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1956. Pp. xiv, 396. $7.50. A searching approach to the methods of transition between practical
fact-finding and concrete proof.
SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF LITIGATION. By Edmund M. Morgan. New York: Columbia

University Press, 1956. Pp. xii, 207. $3.50. James S. Carpenter
Lectures, Columbia University. These lectures deal with judicial notice, hearsay, the function of judge and jury and the relation of pleading to preparation for trial.

INTERNATIONAL LAW
COLLECTIVE SECURITY. By Willard N.
Hogan. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1956. Pp.
*Reviewed in this issue.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
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202. $3.50. A consideration of the "principle of concern" and
its relation to the effectiveness of the establishment of world
peace.
By D. P. O'Connell. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. Pp. xi, 425. $8.50. A
volume which considers the change of sovereignty along with
related legal principles and consequences.

THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION.

NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS.

By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas:
Southern Methodist University Press, 1956. Pp. xvi, 476. $8.00.
A modern evaluation of the principle of non-intervention in
light of developmaents since World War 1I.
International Commission of Jurists. The Hague, Holland, 1956. Pp.
164. A summary of the proceedings of the Congress whose
theme was the consideration of what protection and safeguards
must be provided to cushion an individual from arbitrary
state action.

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS.

JURISPRUDENCE
RELGION, MoRAITY AND LAW. Edited by Arthur L. Harding.

Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956. Pp. xi,
109. $3.00. These four essays delve into the necessity of the
presence of morality and religion in the enactments of our
legislatures.

SOCIAL WELFARE
SOCIAL LEGISLATION. By John D. Hogan and Francis
A. J. lanni. New York: Harper and Bros., 1956. Pp. xvi, 713.
$6.50. A comprehensive analysis of numerous aspects of social
legislation with emphasis on labor, family, and social security
laws.

AMERICAN

PARKING: LEGAL, FINANCIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE. By

the Joint
Committee on Urban Traffic Congestion and Parking. Saugatuck, Conn.: Eno Foundation for Highway Traffic Control,
1956. Pp. xii, 196. A report which explores the problem of
parking created by the mechanized age with stress on the
prospects of off-street parking.

